

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

PLANNING AND EXECUTING NEGOTIATIONS
FOR THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

by


Keil R. Gentry
Major, United States Marine Corps


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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Dr. Stephen O. Fought



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Abstract of

PLANNING AND EXECUTING NEGOTIATIONS
FOR THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

More often than not, negotiations have been a critical component of war termination and mission success. In the past, military officers played a role in negotiations either as negotiators or as advisors to principal negotiators. It appears that this trend will continue. For example, General Schwarzkopf led the coalition negotiation team during the post Operation DESERT STORM cease fire talks and General Zinni participated in negotiations in Haiti and Somalia. Despite these historical precedents, there is no doctrine to guide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or other military officers in negotiations. Furthermore, training in negotiations and negotiating techniques are not part of an officer's professional military education. As a result, military officers are often thrust into the role of negotiator or mediator without proper preparation.

The purpose of this paper is to provide military officers, in general, and JFCs, in particular, with concrete recommendations and sound considerations for the conduct of negotiations. The principles set forth in this paper are applicable to the full spectrum of negotiations, from the "mini" negotiations during peacekeeping operations to cease fire or armistice talks. This paper presents an eleven step negotiation planning process with suggested tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting negotiations.

No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective.¹

--Clausewitz

Introduction

More often than not, negotiations have been a critical component of war termination and mission success. “Between 1800 and 1980, for example, there have been more than sixty interstate wars of which two-thirds ended by negotiation.”² In many of these cases, military officers played a role in negotiations either as negotiators or as advisors to principal negotiators. It appears that this trend will continue. For example, General Schwarzkopf led the coalition negotiation team during the post Operation DESERT STORM cease fire talks and General Zinni participated in negotiations in Haiti and Somalia. Despite the historical precedent, there is no doctrine to guide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) or other military officers in negotiations. Furthermore, training in negotiations and negotiating techniques are not part of an officer’s professional military education. As a result, military officers are often thrust into the role of negotiator or mediator without proper preparation. In a speech to a group of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers, General Zinni stated “It’s stuff [negotiations] we’ve had to learn as we go along by trial and error.”³ Clearly, “trial and error” is not the way to conduct negotiations.

The purpose of this paper is to provide military officers, in general, and JFCs, in particular, with concrete recommendations and sound considerations for the conduct of negotiations. The principles set forth in this paper are applicable to the full spectrum of negotiations, from the “mini” negotiations during peacekeeping operations to cease fire or armistice talks. This paper does not address talks involved with unconditional surrender nor

does it compare and contrast the various methods of negotiations developed over the years. What follows is an eleven step negotiation planning process with suggested tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting negotiations and recommended changes to professional military education, training, and doctrine.

The Negotiation Planning Process

Step 1: Determine the Desired End State

The negotiation planning process begins with the initial receipt of the mission. Joint Publication 3-0 states that **"The desired end state should be clearly described by the NCA before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action [emphasis in the original]."**⁴ The National Command Authorities' (NCA's) desired end state should identify the national objectives or interests of the United States. The regional commander in chief (CINC) will provide further guidance regarding the desired end state. The Political Advisor (POLAD) advises the CINC on how to best support the diplomatic end state through military action. From these national strategic objectives (diplomatic, economic, informational, and military) the JFC must define his or her desired end state. Joint Publication 3-0 goes on to say:

Although military end state conditions normally will represent what combatant commanders want their campaigns to achieve, commanders are rarely concerned with only those conditions. Often, combatant commanders may be required to support the other instruments of national power as directed by national and multinational leadership [emphasis in the original].⁵

This doctrinal guidance implies that the JFC's end state must include conditions that will allow for successful negotiations. B.H. Liddell Hart phrased it this way; "The object in war is a better state of peace—even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire."⁶ The JFC should coordinate the

military plan with the U.S. ambassador to the country where military operations are being conducted to ensure that the military end state supports negotiations. If there is no ambassador, the JFC can request guidance from higher headquarters or request Department of State (DOS) augmentation for the joint task force (JTF) staff.

Step 2: Identify Friendly, Enemy, and Neutral/Third Party Interests

The goal of military negotiations is to satisfy friendly interests. Based on the desired end state of the NCA or the CINC, the JFC can begin to identify friendly interests. Interests are the things that parties truly want and are critical to maximizing negotiations. Interests should not be confused with positions. The following example illustrates the difference between interests and positions. Imagine two children arguing over an orange. Eventually, they agree to divide the orange in half. The first child takes his half, eats the fruit, and throws away the peel. The second child takes her half, throws away the fruit, and bakes a cake with the peel. In this case, the different parts of the orange represent the children's interests, while settling for not less than half of the fruit are their positions.⁷ Depending on the level of negotiations, interests may be strategic (U.S. national interests or the interests of the allies), operational, or tactical. Regional security concerns or the national interests of allied or coalition forces may require the JFC to identify neutral or third party interests in order to ensure a lasting settlement. The interests identified in this step serve as the basis for the negotiations. Once identified, these friendly interests should be sent back up the chain of command to confirm that they are, indeed, the real interests of the United States or the coalition.

The more difficult task is identifying the interests of the enemy. If the underlying interests are not readily apparent, one can start with basic human needs. "Basic human needs include:

- security
- economic well-being
- a sense of belonging
- recognition
- control over one's life"⁸

Identification of enemy interests will most likely require input from DOS and national intelligence sources (e.g., the CIA). This step should be taken at the earliest opportunity as part of war termination planning. After identifying the interests of all parties, the JFC should determine which interests can be satisfied without negotiation.

Step 3: Identify Intelligence Requirements

At this point, the JFC identifies the intelligence requirements peculiar to negotiating. Negotiation-specific intelligence requirements include: cultural intelligence, identifying key leaders/decision makers, developing profiles on key leaders/decision makers, and developing profiles on the enemy's negotiators. The purpose of cultural intelligence is to gain an understanding of the enemy's underlying interests, strengths, and weaknesses. This knowledge will aid the commander in determining which bargaining levers are likely to aid in negotiations which in turn will guide military action to control those levers.

In addition to identifying bargaining levers, it is critical to identify the enemy's key leaders/decision makers. Through experience, General Zinni learned that culture plays a large role in determining who is a key leader/decision maker and who is not. Based on this information, the JFC can determine with whom to negotiate. In Somalia, failure to acknowledge key tribal leaders adversely affected negotiations.⁹ Once key leaders/decision

makers are identified, then the intelligence community can begin putting together profiles on them. This will aid the JFC in forming his negotiating strategy, particularly regarding the choice of bargaining levers. Finally, profiles on the actual enemy negotiators "can be used during the negotiations to secure and maintain the psychological advantage so necessary from time to time."¹⁰ This step may be conducted concurrently with Step 2 and will likely be an ongoing process.

Step 4: Identify Negotiation Points

Based on the underlying interests of the United States and/or the coalition, the JFC can identify specific negotiation points. Table 1 contains a list of negotiating points that the JFC may consider. This list, of course, is not all-inclusive.

Considerations for Negotiating Points	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Cease fires <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ When does it take effect? ▪ How long does it remain in effect? ▪ What types of fires are restricted/authorized? □ Handling cease fire or armistice violations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establishment of a Military Coordination Center (MCC)? ▪ Reporting mechanism/chain? ▪ Penalties for violations? □ Boundaries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Along current battle lines? ▪ Along geographic features? ▪ Along antebellum borders? □ Use of fixed/rotary wing aircraft <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Armed or unarmed? ▪ Day and/or night restrictions? ▪ Authorized routes? ▪ Aircraft marking (use of navigation lights)? ▪ Air traffic control procedures? □ Disarmament procedures <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Security requirements? ▪ Personal weapon policy? ▪ Collection points? ▪ Collection timetables? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Nuclear, chemical, and/or biological ▪ Which facilities should be inspected/destroyed? ▪ Who should inspect (UN, combined friendly/enemy teams, etc.)? ▪ Inspection timetables? ▪ Policy regarding delivery systems? □ Movement restrictions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Day/night restrictions? ▪ Convoy markings (headlights, air panels, etc.)? ▪ Authorized routes? ▪ Traffic control/Movement priorities? ▪ Type units? □ Withdrawal timetables □ Public order <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Who provides/supervises police protection? ▪ Who provides/supervises fire protection? □ Relief operations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Food/Water/Medical? ▪ Role of PVOs/NGOs? □ Economic sanctions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Are they targeting the right people? □ Diplomatic considerations (get DOS guidance) □ Establish mechanism to adjudicate/resolve problems <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Long term solution to the problem (particularly applicable to peacekeeping)

Table 1

Step 5: Identify Bargaining Levers

Based on the negotiating points selected in Step 4, the JFC can then identify which levers will compel the enemy to come to terms most agreeable to the United States or the coalition. Bargaining levers can be in the form of military position, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, or an informational advantage. In order to be effective, a bargaining lever should convince the enemy that a negotiated settlement is better than his best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). A BATNA is the course of action that best meets a party's interests if a negotiated agreement does not satisfy all (or enough) of the party's interests.¹¹ Additionally, one's own BATNA may be a bargaining lever. One's BATNA can include stalling for time to create an operational pause (much like the North Koreans and the North Vietnamese did) or it could mean resuming hostilities.

Step 6: Select the Friendly Negotiating Team

Because of the importance and complexity of many negotiations, the JFC should consider forming a negotiating team. There are a number of advantages in using a team for negotiations, to include documenting the process, providing translator support, allowing for different perspectives on how the negotiations are proceeding, and catching something another member has missed. The JFC should choose subject matter experts based on the negotiating points identified in Step 4. When selecting team members, the JFC should consider people who possess the qualities of good negotiators.

Although no two successful negotiators are the same, the following characteristics are indicators of negotiating ability:

- Intelligent
- Mature
- Well mannered

- Extroverted
- Able to confront issues head on
- Capable of making sound decisions rapidly
- Able to assume responsibility
- Possess a sense of humor
- Practical minded
- Possess a positive attitude
- Skeptical

Several characteristics require further explanation. Being well mannered is culturally dependent. A good negotiator is well versed in the enemy's etiquette allowing him or her to send and receive the correct cultural messages (e.g., anger, indignation, intimidation, cooperation, etc.). Since successful negotiations require people skills, a negotiator should be more extroverted than introverted. A good sense of humor can be a great asset because it allows the negotiator to separate him or her self from the issues at hand, which is particularly important if negotiations become heated. It also allows the negotiator to develop a better rapport with his or her counterpart. Humor should be used carefully, however, because, in some cultures, it is viewed as a weakness. A practical minded negotiator is more likely to negotiate a settlement that makes sense to the operator who will have to implement it. A positive attitude is essential, especially if negotiations drag on for an extended period of time (e.g., the Korean and Vietnamese negotiations). Additionally, a negotiator should be somewhat skeptical, which is a balance between being naïve and being cynical. Many of the above listed qualities can be found in a pamphlet written by Gordon Wade Rule, who conducted numerous negotiations both as a Navy officer and as a private lawyer.¹²

Cultural biases may influence the composition of the negotiating team. For example, in Sierra Leone, Ambassador Peters was considered to be a "White Witch." This local belief gave her special cultural leverage among the various factions.¹³ It is obvious that cultural intelligence should guide the JFC in selecting a negotiating team.

In multilateral talks, other members of the negotiating team may be senior officers from allied or coalition forces. For instance, officers from all branches of the U.S. armed forces and senior officers from the Republic of Korea negotiated on behalf of the United Nations during the Korean War armistice talks. More recently, Saudi General Khalid and General Schwarzkopf represented the coalition forces in the post DESERT STORM cease fire talks.

Step 7: Identify the Enemy Negotiating Team

When identifying the enemy negotiating team, it is important to determine what authority they have to negotiate. If they are merely mouthpieces or messenger boys for the real decision-makers, then the JFC should consider not negotiating with them. Ambassador Peters insists that one should not negotiate at all with someone who does not have equal negotiating authority.¹⁴ The bottom line is that the enemy negotiator must have enough authority to agree to terms.

Step 8: Determine Ground Rules for the Conduct of Negotiations

Establishing ground rules before actual negotiations take place facilitates the negotiating process and helps reduce the possibility of time wasted through misunderstanding. At this point, both sides should agree to an agenda for the negotiations. Ground rules may also include: no public statements prior to agreement, some restrictions on public statements, closed or open negotiations, brainstorming sessions with non-attribution, etc.

Ground rules should focus on the conduct of the negotiations, not the substance of the negotiations. Mr. Goldamer (then a RAND advisor to Vice Admiral Joy during the 1951 Korean Armistice talks) states in his memoirs that "considerable time was lost" in the Korean

armistice talks, because the North Koreans kept trying to include an agreement to a demarcation line along the 38th parallel in the agenda rather than make the demarcation line a point of negotiation.¹⁵

Step 9: Choose a Negotiating Site

One should select a site where each side feels physically safe and secure.¹⁶

Considerations for a negotiating site include: ease of access, existing infrastructure, impact on combat operations, impact on the tone of the negotiations, and cultural significance.

Obviously, the site should be accessible to all parties. Factors include time, distance, and available transportation. Clearly, the site should be able to support the negotiations. Major negotiations may require airstrips, roads, power, existing buildings, etc. Lower level negotiations may require little more than a patch of shade from a tree.

When negotiating while fighting, it is important to consider how site selection will effect future operations. Failure to think through all of the ramifications for selecting a particular site can lead to damaging consequences. Mr. Goldhamer stated the following about Kaesong, which was the original site of the 1951 Korean armistice talks.

I should mention here that the choice of Kaesong as the site of the armistice talks was extremely crippling later to the U.N. when it became desirable to put on military pressure. Kaesong and the neutral zone around Kaesong anchored the Communist line in the west and made military operations in the west extremely difficult if not impossible. This was precisely the area where military pressure by the U.N., if it were to be exercised at all as in fact it later was, would have had by far the greatest effect. But this was excluded.¹⁷

In a more recent example, General Schwarzkopf very nearly jeopardized the cease fire talks because he had selected Safwan as the negotiating site based on erroneous reports that it had been secured by VII Corps. In reality, a Republican Guard tank unit occupied the airstrip at Safwan. General Schwarzkopf was faced with the embarrassing situation of going

to the Iraqis to negotiate, instead of the Iraqis coming to him. As a result, he ordered VII Corps to remove the Iraqi unit. Fortunately, the Iraqis withdrew without firing a shot. Had the standoff at Safwan resulted in bloodshed, General Schwarzkopf felt he would have had an international incident on his hands.¹⁸

Cultural factors can also influence site selection. In this regard, cultural intelligence can be useful in determining a site's historical significance. Whether a site carries a good or bad connotation can either aid or hinder negotiations.¹⁹ For example, the site where King Solomon sat in judgement would be preferable to Masada where ancient Jews committed suicide to avoid being massacred. Additionally, in peacekeeping operations, one should consider whether site selection favors one faction over another or whether it puts a particular faction at a disadvantage. Either situation can detract from the perceived impartiality of the peacekeeping force.

Step 10: Establish the Negotiating Site

The intent of this step is to create an environment that is conducive to negotiations and that satisfies administrative, logistics, and communications requirements. Considerations for establishing a negotiating site include: seating, shape/size of the table, a briefing area, security, support requirements, berthing requirements, feeding requirements, media considerations, etc.

The site should include a general negotiating area that is large enough to accommodate both negotiating teams in addition to private areas where the teams can meet separately. Communications facilities need to be established to allow both negotiating teams to contact their respective seniors as required.

The basic seating arrangement, type of chairs, size and shape of the table, etc. should be worked out when establishing the ground rules. While these issues may seem trivial, they can be vitally important. On the first day of the Korean Armistice talks, the North Koreans and the UN negotiators sat in identical chairs across from each other. Because the UN negotiators were taller, they looked down on the North Koreans. The situation was intolerable to the North Koreans, so they replaced the UN chairs with shorter chairs. The UN negotiators accepted the change, which the North Koreans took as a sign of weakness. Had the physical inequity been worked out prior to the actual negotiations, both sides would have been satisfied.²⁰ During the Paris peace talks with the North Vietnamese, many weeks were spent determining the size and shape of the negotiating table as well as the seating around it. To the North Vietnamese, these were vital interests of legitimacy and national prestige. It behooves the JFC to determine the interests that lie beneath the seemingly trivial positions.

Generically, negotiators can either sit around a table or they can sit in a semicircle facing an audiovisual aid. Although sitting around a table is more traditional, having everyone sit in a semicircle may help focus the negotiators on the issues at hand.

An area should be set aside for briefing the media. If the negotiations are likely to last several days or weeks, then one should establish messing and berthing areas. Messing should take into consideration cultural dietary restrictions. When in doubt, chicken and rice is a safe menu as it does not offend any major culture.²¹ The rank and gender compositions of the negotiating teams are prime considerations for berthing.

Step 11: Negotiate

At this point, the JFC is ready to negotiate. Specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for negotiations are covered in the following section. Appendix A summarizes the negotiation planning process.

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Negotiations

Before addressing specific tactics, techniques, and procedures for negotiation, it is beneficial to establish a theoretical framework. Although there are numerous methods of negotiating, this paper focuses on interest based negotiations developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project. The desired end state of their method is a lasting settlement that is agreeable to both parties. To begin, one must identify the interests of both parties. By understanding the underlying interests, one can then more successfully and creatively negotiate the points identified in Step 4. More often than not, people tend to negotiate based on positions. The Egyptian-Israeli peace talks provide a good example of how positions can get in the way of negotiations, while the underlying interests of the two parties hold the solution. After the Six Day War in 1967, Israel occupied the Sinai. The occupation of the Sinai became a key negotiating position for both sides during the 1978 peace talks. Each side produced maps dividing the Sinai with boundaries that were unacceptable to the other side. Eventually, both sides looked at their underlying interests. To Israel, occupation of the Sinai was an issue of state security. To Egypt, occupation of the Sinai was a matter of sovereignty dating back to the Pharaohs. Once their interests were clearly articulated, they were able to reach a settlement. Today, the Egyptian flag flies over a demilitarized Sinai.²² Additionally, a multinational observer force remains in place to ensure compliance with the accords and to assuage security concerns of both parties. By

concentrating on interests, it is possible to find creative solutions that satisfy both parties, which is more likely to produce a lasting settlement.

The technique of identifying underlying interests is particularly applicable to peacekeeping operations. Instead of being a negotiator, the JFC will often play the role of mediator. In this case, the JFC should identify the interests of all parties in order to resolve conflict or potential conflict.

In addition to the preceding theoretical framework, the JFC can apply the following negotiation techniques:

- Insulating the chief negotiator
- Determining and using the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)
- Negotiating as a team
- Maintaining official records
- Establishing a mechanism to ensure compliance with the agreement

In the early stages of a negotiation, it may prove beneficial to insulate the chief negotiators from “working” positions or offers. By proffering potential areas of agreement through an intermediary, it is possible for the chief negotiators to find common ground without committing themselves to a position that may not be politically acceptable without some sort of *quid pro quo* from the opposition. For instance, the King of Morocco offered his good offices to the aides of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin in the early stages of the Egyptian-Israeli peace talks. The aides unofficially floated positions to each other and were eventually able to determine where their respective heads of state would be able to successfully negotiate.²³ In extended negotiations, a JFC may seek potential agreement by proposing negotiating points through action officers or working groups.

In order to negotiate more effectively, one should identify the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) for each party. By knowing his or her BATNA, a negotiator

can determine when negotiations are no longer fruitful. A good negotiator can exploit the enemy's BATNA by pointing out that a failure to reach an agreement will result in a worse condition for the enemy through either resumed hostilities or increased demands.

When negotiating as a team, it is critical that the team speaks with one voice. It is up to the team leader to resolve any differences among the team members prior to meeting with the enemy. To avoid mixed signals, only one person should talk at one time on any given point. The team leader must keep the overall objectives of the negotiations in mind at all times.²⁴

It is important to maintain a record of official negotiations. Accurate records are critical because one cannot possibly remember every point discussed and agreed upon during negotiations.²⁵ Additionally, the JFC will likely have to report the results of strategic or operational level negotiations up the chain of command in excruciating detail. Record keeping can be as elaborate as typed transcripts (preferably in all applicable languages) or as simple as a tape recording. For instance, General Schwarzkopf elected to use only audio tapes as a record of the cease fire talks with both parties receiving copies.²⁶ If possible, any written material that is transmitted from one side to the other should be written in all applicable languages to better ensure clear understanding between the parties.²⁷ Finally, both parties must agree on the wording of any written agreement. Due to the nuances of different languages, both parties should either officially recognize the agreement in one language as binding or approve each translation.

Finally, negotiations should conclude with a mechanism to ensure compliance, respond to problems and complaints, adjudicate violations, and solve problems. The previously cited military observer group in the Sinai is a good example of a mechanism to

ensure compliance. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the coalition and the Iraqis formed a military coordination center to address problems and complaints. A method of adjudicating violations is to empower a third party to arbitrate as necessary. Successful negotiations establish a problem solving mechanism to prevent future conflict. A problem solving mechanism can be as big as the UN or it can simply be a forum to address concerns. In peacekeeping operations, a problem solving mechanism is critical. To paraphrase General Zinni, anyone who has a gun and/or a vested interest in the political or military outcome should have a forum to voice issues. When they're talking, they're not shooting.²⁸

Conclusion

As military officers are likely to continue to participate in negotiations well into the foreseeable future, three recommendations naturally follow.

First of all, it is clear that there is a need for study in negotiations as part of an officer's professional military education. At the intermediate level school level, education should be aimed at the action officer level. At the senior level, the focus should shift to encompass principal negotiating skills in addition to action officer requirements. At the flag or JFC level, negotiation education could be part of a capstone program.

Second, negotiation training should be integrated into major exercises. This integration would force commanders and staffs to focus their plans towards successful war termination as well as provide training in the art of negotiation. DOS participation would further synergize the effort.

Finally, negotiation planning and execution should be included in doctrine. The negotiation planning process should be integrated with the current deliberate and crisis

planning processes. Additionally, the Joint Staff should develop a doctrinal publication for the conduct of negotiations.

Finally, a military victory is all for naught if the JFC fails to properly plan for and execute negotiations.

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989), 579.

² Allan E. Goodman and Sandra Clemens Bogart Making Peace The United States and Conflict Resolution (Boulder: Westview Press 1992), 1.

³ Gen Anthony C. Zinni, speech, Military Interaction with Non-Military Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Examples from Somalia and Elsewhere, CIA Washington, D.C.: 6 March 1996.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington, D.C.: 1 February 1995), III-2.

⁵ Ibid., III-2.

⁶ B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1962), 351.

⁷ Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New York: Penguin Books 1991), 57.

⁸ Ibid., 48.

⁹ Zinni, speech, 6 March 1996.

¹⁰ Gordon Wade Rule, The Art of Negotiation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy 1963), 32.

¹¹ Fisher and Ury, 99-100.

¹² Rule, 10-14.

¹³ Ambassador Lauralee M. Peters, US State Department Representative to the U.S. Naval War College, interview by author, 20 January 1998.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Herbert Goldhamer, The 1951 Korean Armistice Conference A Personal Memoir (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1994), 59-60.

¹⁶ Ambassador Peters, interview, 20 January 1998.

¹⁷ Goldhamer, 59.

¹⁸ H. Norman Schwarzkopf and Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books 1993), 550-553.

¹⁹ Ambassador Peters, interview, 20 January 1998.

²⁰ Goldhamer, 61.

²¹ Ambassador Peters, interview, 20 January 1998.

²² Fisher and Ury, 41-42.

²³ Ambassador Peters, interview, 20 January 1998.

²⁴ Rule, 33 and 45.

²⁵ Ibid., 40.


²⁶ Schwarzkopf and Petre, 564 and 567.

²⁷ Rule, 36.

²⁸ Zinni, speech, 6 March 1996.

Appendix A

The Negotiation Planning Process



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